人類從「叢林鐵律」，進化到小農經濟，再進化到市場經濟，人類的智慧程式也一直在進化著，但始終還沒有取得社會智慧。所以才有四個蠟燭的的告白。
可以這麼說，當人們還對信仰、希望、和平和仁愛念念有詞的時候，就說明人類還沒有取得社會智慧。
當交換將權力逼出歷史舞臺，市場經濟完成它的歷史使命的時候，人類就會將信仰、希望、和平和仁愛這樣的詞彚丟到歷史垃圾桶裡。
當你看不透生命的時候，才會有信仰（信仰就是將自己完全托付給一個能夠給予安全的鏡像訊息，這個鏡像訊息一定是神聖的，不神聖又如何保護得了你呢，所以當這樣鏡像訊息被他人說三道四的時候，你會和他拼命，因為你認為他是在要你的命。信仰，不僅僅是宗教的，也包括階級——社群壁壘——信仰，也就是無所不能可以庇護你的地位的壁壘）；當你失望的時候，才會說希望（這是一組正反，受正反原理制約）；當你對戰爭感到無奈的時候，你才會祈求和平（這也是一組正反，受正反原理制約）；當你感到粗暴威脅的時候才會說仁愛（這一樣是一組正反，受正反原理制約）。
智慧不是僅僅用於認知世界，智慧還必須用於克服自己的盲目本能，只有每個人意識到必須克服自己的本能荒謬的時候，人類才取得社會智慧。只有這個時候，人類才進入一個智慧社會，甚麼「叢林鐵律」，甚麼小農經濟，甚麼市場經濟，甚麼權力，甚麼社會社群壁壘，人和人之間的甚麼等級區別，都將是不會再有的噩夢，它們通通將成為人類古老的記憶和笑話。古代，人們把上古時代的美好記憶當作神話傳說，將來，人類也只能將歷史上不美好的事跡當作笑話看了，他們可不能理解，為甚麼人類曾經幹了那麼多蠢事（例如，一個人以對自己最理想的需求實踐，卻使集體陷入了不理想的境界，這個人正是這個集體的不可分割的一份子——奧爾森所說的社會行為，貪婪無厭導致同歸於盡）。
用以認知世界的智慧，古月語當作是個人的智慧，用以克服自己本能荒謬的智慧，只有人人都做到的時候，才會具有社會意義，因此是社會的智慧。
人類會有這一天嗎？人類既然能夠從「叢林鐵律」進化到小農經濟，又從小農經濟進化到市場經濟，從蛋白質的本質看，人類既然可以取得智慧程式，當然就會進化到一個嶄新的智慧社會。
信仰，長久以來，人們總是被信仰這個詞彚的表面字義欺騙。以為信仰就是相信有一個可以主宰萬物的東西。萬物的反面是甚麼？萬物的反面就是自己，因此，以正反原理，所謂主宰萬物，實際上只是想說主宰自己而已。
因此，主宰自己的東西，就是決定自己如何生存下去的東西。這個東西在自己之外嗎？
自古以來，人們一代一代的傳下來，潛移默化，我們真的以為存在一個無所不能的上帝。這是一代又一代謬誤，有誰想過，這個上帝就是你自己。古月語不是佛教徒，古月語沒有信仰。但只有佛陀說過，佛可以就是你自己。以其他宗教和主義的同義語來說，上帝，或者導師可以就是你自己，只有你自己才是可以決定你自己的命運。當然你完全可以決定將自己交給上帝，交給Ｘ。
除了唯一的佛家和道家鏡像訊息之外，其它的一切宗教和主義，都在塑造一個高高在上，令人不可仰視、不可質疑的造物主、救世主、導師，這一點，佛家和道家正好和其它一切宗教或主義相反。祭司也好、牧師也好，衛道者也好，他們都需要維持一個森嚴的、不可逾越的壁壘，也只有這樣，一切權力和秩序才能維持。但是，交換，這個被市場經濟發揮得至矣盡矣的社會行為正將一切權力和秩序瓦解，人類，和其它生命一樣，本來都是一套蛋白質程式體系嘛，壁壘正是智慧程式的一大謬誤。
剛剛看完一個片集。說一個本能程式有岔路(一切都正常，智力正常甚至還高，但有獨特的癖好)的罪犯，專門綁架虜禁對人生充滿憧憬，有親人關愛的女子。看著俘虜如何絕望，如何放棄求生。你說這個罪犯從中得到亢奮也好，或者就像片集借這個罪犯之口說，信仰原來也是假的。
蛋白質在三十億年的進化過程中形成的本能程式就是一套求生程式，因此人類以外的生物，它們沒有智慧程式，因此也沒有信仰，但它們一定具有天生的求生欲望。
人是一種生命，自然就具有這樣的求生欲望。只不過是，人，想知道在無路可走的情況下，例如人人都必須面對的死亡，還有甚麼可能的求生，或解脫途徑。於是，人，利用進化取得的智慧程式，給自己製造了一個假象，讓自己在絕境下依然保存希望——信仰。
當你看穿生命的時候，你還需要信仰嗎？看穿生命，你可曾想過，這，實際上也是一種信仰，只不過你明白生命的規律，明白，沒有任何東西是可以改變已經存在的規律，包括上帝，也包括你自己。看穿事物的規律，也是一種信仰，是一種沒有上帝，沒有主義，不需要借助自己之外的東西，明白自己已經看穿了需要看穿的規律。
為甚麼一切夜伏晝出的生命，包括人類，而且不管閣下信仰甚麼，見到藍天白雲總是會雀躍，見到烏雲滿天會萎縮？
世界上好多事情是和通常意義上的信仰無關。因為信仰是進化後期的事，有時還是一種圈套。例如，神權統治帶來中世紀的黑暗，人類唾棄了神權，卻又保留了相關的信仰，和老耄現象一樣，是生命學、歷史學、社會學和哲學上十分奇特的現象。
如果閣下只見到海市蜃樓，沒有見到其他的，或者沒有其它更先進的智慧可以辨識海市蜃樓的真偽，就像在快要沒頂的時候，哪怕抓到一根稻草都會不放手，或者在歷史列車急轉彎時候衍生的老耄現象，可以稱之為信仰嗎？
例如，上文提到的那個本能程式缺陷病患者，即使他不是虜禁經過特選的女人做觀察對象，他也不是一個學者，因為他僅僅是為了追求一種精神亢奮，而不是尋找生命現象背後的本質，雖然他對虜禁的女人從不施暴。但是他所要觀察的現象只能是發展出智慧程式的生物才可以表現出來，當古月語見到被他放到井水裡的一個女人（會游水）見到一個五六歲的小孩伸過頭來看她的時候，請求那個小孩救她，那個小孩竟然向他吐口水、丟石頭，古月語當堂毛骨悚然，而她也因此放棄了求生的意志，是不是恥於在這個冷漠的世間茍活？這又和信仰有關嗎？人之初性本善，是不是也是一種信仰？我們應該堅信人性向善，還是堅信人性向惡？這又和階級學說（龍生龍鳳生鳳，老鼠生兒打地洞）有關嗎？
近乎一生的虛耗，說無悔無怨也並非無理，根本無從悔也無從怨。
我們族人要比先進的民族多承受三個世紀的小農經濟演化，又豈是一言一語說得清？說實在的，像美索不達米亞人（五千三百年前），印度人（五千年前），埃及人（四千六百年前），希臘人（兩千八百年前），還有瑪雅人（一千三百年前），想起他們也有燦爛的古代文明的時候，他們也會無悔無怨嗎？說真的，他們需要悔、怨嗎？像猶太人、阿拉伯人，他們雖然沒有顯赫的古代文明，但也是當今兩大宗教信仰的發源民族。信仰並沒有左右一個社群的歷史進化。社會進化是一個非常複雜的動態，就像南美洲的一隻蝴蝶隨便拍一下翅膀都足以改變在佛羅里達州的颶風方向，一個偶然的社會事件都可能讓歷史列車出軌。
古月語喜蹚歷史渾水，並非想尋覓一隻蛤蟆來揶揄歷史人物，說尋覓智慧的足跡又未免自視太高了。說實在的，古月語只是想在歷史的渾水裡找到自己想找的東西，甚麼東西呢？也還沒有想到。只是，古月語總感到，有些古月語要見的東西藏在歷史渾水裡，古月語也感到，可能也藏在蛋白質裡。
就像有人喜歡旅行，想看沒有見過的東西而已。
世上好多人並不是按信仰生活，他們只是按蛋白質三十億年進化形成的本能程式生活。本能程式實際上就是上古時的野性圖騰，叢林裡的鐵律。
（資料取自自由百科全書）「圖騰崇拜是將某種動物或植物等特定物體視作與本氏族有親屬或其他特殊關係的崇拜行為，是原始宗教的最初形式，大約出現在舊石器時代晚期。圖騰為印第安語totem的音譯 ，源自北美阿耳貢金人奧季布瓦族方言ototeman，意為「他的親族」或「他的氏族」，相當於是整個部族的標記。許多氏族往往以它命名。
圖騰崇拜的動物是不能捕殺的，只能在特殊的場合舉行祭祀時才能殺死它。
以澳洲的原住民為例，他們認為靈魂會離開身體，並會停留在圖騰（即生物的替身）上。」
[1]
The Arecibo Message as a 23 by 73 character message
This picture does not seem to tell us much, so maybe we should look at the Arecibo Message as a 73 by 23 character message.
0000001010101000000000000101000001010000000100100010001000100101100101010
1010101010100100100000000000000000000000000000000000001100000000000000000
0011010000000000000000000110100000000000000000010101000000000000000000111
1100000000000000000000000000000000110000111000110000110001000000000000011
0010000110100011000110000110101111101111101111101111100000000000000000000
0000001000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000011
1111000000000000011111000000000000000000000001100001100001110001100010000
0001000000000100001101000011000111001101011111011111011111011111000000000
0000000000000000010000001100000000010000000000011000000000000000100000110
0000000001111110000011000000111110000000000110000000000000100000000100000
0001000001000000110000000100000001100001100000010000000000110001000011000
0000000000001100110000000000000110001000011000000000110000110000001000000
0100000010000000010000010000000110000000010001000000001100000000100010000
0000010000000100000100000001000000010000000100000000000011000000000110000
0000110000000001000111010110000000000010000000100000000000000100000111110
0000000000010000101110100101101100000010011100100111111101110000111000001
1011100000000010100000111011001000000101000001111110010000001010000011000
0001000001101100000000000000000000000000000000000111000001000000000000001
1101010001010101010100111000000000101010100000000000000001010000000000000
0111110000000000000000111111111000000000000111000000011100000000011000000
0000011000000011010000000001011000001100110000000110011000010001010000010
1000100001000100100010010001000000001000101000100000000000010000100001000
0000000001000000000100000000000000100101000000000001111001111101001111000
摘自自由百科全書：
「信仰，是指對某種主張、主義、或神的旨意的信服和尊崇，並把它奉為自己的行為準則。信仰與崇拜經常聯繫在一起，但是與崇拜還有不同。信仰主要針對「觀念」，而崇拜主要針對某個「個體」，例如上帝、耶穌、太陽、獅子等。信仰與「認知（相信）」不同，一般說認知（相信）一種理論，而不是說信仰一種理論。信仰帶有情感體驗色彩，特別是體現在宗教信仰上。
信仰是人對人生觀、價值觀和世界觀等的選擇和持有。信仰體現著人生價值、人生意義的可靠落實。信仰與所信仰的物件是否客觀存在沒有必然聯繫。（古月語並不認同這段話）宗教並非信仰物件，而是信仰的表現形式，表現形式不可作為信仰物件。
信仰可以是外在的，其形成往往是社會的、宗教的傳統影響所至。如果一個伊斯蘭教家庭從一個基督教家庭收養一個剛出生的小孩，那小孩長大就會變成一個伊斯蘭教徒；反之也是如此。但信仰亦可以是內在的，透過個人的經歷和對靈性的追尋，而選擇一種適合自己的宗教信仰。信仰可以獲得，可以被塑造，也可以被拋棄。雖然有不少宗教對信徒的離開有嚴格限制，但根據聯合國的《人權公約》，人是有選擇宗教、或選擇不信仰宗教的自由。」
看看英文又是怎麼說的：
「Belief is the psychological state in which an individual holds a proposition(主張，提議) or premise to be true.[1]
Belief, knowledge and epistemology(認識論)
The relationship between belief and knowledge is subtle(複雜，難明). Believers in a claim(主張) typically say that they know that claim. For instance, those who believe that the Sun is a god will report that they know that the Sun is a god. However, the terms belief and knowledge are used differently by philosophers.
Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge and belief. A primary problem for epistemology is exactly what is needed in order for us to have knowledge. In a notion derived from Plato's dialogue Theaetetus, philosophy has traditionally defined knowledge as justified true belief. The relationship between belief and knowledge is that a belief is knowledge if the belief is true, and if the believer has a justification (reasonable and necessarily plausible(言詞伶俐) assertions(斷言)/evidence/guidance(指引)) for believing it is true.
A false(偽) belief is not considered to be knowledge, even if it is sincere(誠信). A sincere believer in the flat earth theory does not know that the Earth is flat. Similarly, a truth that nobody believes is not knowledge, because in order to be knowledge, there must be some person who knows it.
Later epistemologists have questioned the "justified true belief" definition, and some philosophers have questioned whether "belief" is a useful notion at all.
Belief as a psychological theory
Mainstream psychology and related disciplines have traditionally treated belief as if it were the simplest form of mental representation and therefore one of the building blocks of conscious thought. Philosophers have tended to be more rigorous in their analysis and much of the work examining the viability of the belief concept stems from philosophical analysis.
The concept of belief presumes a subject (the believer) and an object of belief (the proposition). So like other propositional attitudes, belief implies the existence of mental states and intentionality, both of which are hotly debated topics in the philosophy of mind and whose foundations and relation to brain states are still controversial.
Beliefs are sometimes divided into core beliefs (those which you may be actively thinking about) and dispositional beliefs (those which you may ascribe to but have never previously thought about). For example, if asked 'do you believe tigers wear pink pajamas ?' a person might answer that they do not, despite the fact they may never have thought about this situation before.[2]
That a belief is a mental state has been seen, by some, as contentious. While some philosophers have argued that beliefs are represented in the mind as sentence-like constructs others have gone as far as arguing that there is no consistent or coherent mental representation that underlies our common use of the belief concept and is therefore obsolete and should be rejected.
This has important implications for understanding the neuropsychology and neuroscience of belief. If the concept of belief is incoherent or ultimately indefensible then any attempt to find the underlying neural processes which support it will fail. If the concept of belief does turn out to be useful, then this goal should (in principle) be achievable.
Philosopher Lynne Rudder Baker has outlined four main contemporary approaches to belief in her book Saving Belief:
Our common-sense understanding of belief is correct - Sometimes called the ‘mental sentence theory’, in this conception, beliefs exist as coherent entities and the way we talk about them in everyday life is a valid basis for scientific endeavour. Jerry Fodor is one of the principal defenders of this point of view.
Our common-sense understanding of belief may not be entirely correct, but it is close enough to make some useful predictions - This view argues that we will eventually reject the idea of belief as we use it now, but that there may be a correlation between what we take to be a belief when someone says 'I believe that snow is white' and however a future theory of psychology will explain this behaviour. Most notably philosopher Stephen Stich has argued for this particular understanding of belief.
Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong and will be completely superseded by a radically different theory which will have no use for the concept of belief as we know it - Known as eliminativism, this view, (most notably proposed by Paul and Patricia Churchland), argues that the concept of belief is like obsolete theories of times past such as the four humours theory of medicine, or the phlogiston theory of combustion. In these cases science hasn’t provided us with a more detailed account of these theories, but completely rejected them as valid scientific concepts to be replaced by entirely different accounts. The Churchlands argue that our common-sense concept of belief is similar, in that as we discover more about neuroscience and the brain, the inevitable conclusion will be to reject the belief hypothesis in its entirety.
Our common-sense understanding of belief is entirely wrong, however treating people, animals and even computers as if they had beliefs, is often a successful strategy - The major proponents of this view, Daniel Dennett and Lynne Rudder Baker, are both eliminativists in that they believe that beliefs are not a scientifically valid concept, but they don’t go as far as rejecting the concept of belief as a predictive device. Dennett gives the example of playing a computer at chess. While few people would agree that the computer held beliefs, treating the computer as if it did (e.g. that the computer believes that taking the opposition’s queen will give it a considerable advantage) is likely to be a successful and predictive strategy. In this understanding of belief, named by Dennett the intentional stance, belief based explanations of mind and behaviour are at a different level of explanation and are not reducible to those based on fundamental neuroscience although both may be explanatory at their own level.
Is belief voluntary?
Belief formation has not been shown either to be primarily spontaneous and involuntary or not. Some accept information supporting narrow and specific beliefs. Others invoke a more challenging and broad study of others or alternate beliefs across many cultures and traditions. A small minority of people are able to live without drawing automatic conclusions. The human mind has been shown to prefer certainty, over uncertainty, even if these assumptions are unverifiable. This phenomena results when people are often forced to make either "for or against" choices. In a polarized world of so-called binary choices (either/or), this is more common in time of stress (war, panic, etc).
Proclaimed belief is often found to be mandatory for group affiliation and "official" membership with specific conversion rites. In many cases, people bolster a personal belief, in which they are emotionally involved, attempting to resolve directly experienced contradictions. Creative rationializations are produced to reduce experiential dissonance. Human imagination serves as the catalyst for the creation, modification and perpetuation of belief.
People often believe merely what they wish to be true[citation needed], and fortify this stance in their mind, no matter how much it stands in direct opposition to their experiential life. Belief, as a component of the human mind, is true speculation when assumptions cannot be verified and logically reconciled to the external world.
Delusional beliefs
Delusions are defined as beliefs in psychiatric diagnostic criteria (for example in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). Psychiatrist and historian G. E. Berrios has challenged the view that delusions are genuine beliefs and instead labels them as "empty speech acts", where affected persons are motivated to express false or bizarre belief statements due to an underlying psychological disturbance. However, the majority of mental health professionals and researchers treat delusions as if they were genuine beliefs.
In Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking-Glass, the White Queen says, "Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast." This is often quoted in mockery of the common ability of people to entertain beliefs contrary to fact.
Notes
1.Schwitzgebel, Eric (2006), "Belief", in Zalta, Edward, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab, [url]http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/[/url], retrieved on 19 September 2008
2.Bell, V., Halligan, P.W. & Ellis, H.D. (2006) A Cognitive Neuroscience of Belief. In P.W. Halligan & M. Aylward (eds) The Power of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.」
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